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Page 4 in the original is blank. I.  The  sources  of Commu~ity law 
1.  Written  sources 
Foremost among the written sources of Community law is  the so-called primary legislation 
of the  European Community created directly  by  the Member States.  It comprises the 
Community  law  contained  in  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European  Communities 
themselves, including the annexes, schedules and protocols attached to the Treaties and the 
subsequent additions  and amendments thereto.  These  include,  i.a.: 
- Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC =  European 
Coal and Steel Community) of 18  April  1951  - 'Treaty of Paris'; 
- Treaty  establishing  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC  =  Common 
Market) of 25  March  1957  - 'Treaty of Rome'; 
- Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC =  Euratom) 
of 25  March  1957  - 'Treaty of Rome'; 
- Convention on certain  Institutions common to the European Communities of 25 
March  1957; 
- Treaty establishing  a  Single  Council  and  a  Single  Commission  of the  European 
Communities (Merger Treaty) of 8  April  1965; 
- Treaty  concerning  the  accession  of  the  Kingdom  of  Denmark,  Ireland,  (the 
Kingdom  of Norway)  and  the  United  Kingdom  of Great Britain  and  Northern 
Ireland to the EEC and Euratom of 22 January 1972, including the Act concerning 
the  Conditions  of  Accession  and  the  Adjustments  to  the  Treaties  (Accession 
Treaty and  Act of Accession); 
- Association Agreement with Greece of 9 July 1961, with Turkey of 12 September 
1963,  with  the  African,  Caribbean  and  Pacific  States  (ACP  countries)  of 28 
February 1975  (First  Lome Convention), etc. 
The  secondary  legislation  of the  Community  is  a  further  written  source  of Community 
law.  This consists of the law created by the Community institutions.  It comes into being 
primarily as a result of the legal acts expressly provided for in the Treaties in so far as they 
concern binding rules.  This is the case with regulations, directives, decisions addressed to 
individuals  and States,  and  recommendations made  under the  ECSC Treaty. 
International agreements  concluded  by  the  Community as  an  entity  having  international 
legal personality may be considered the final written source of Community law.  The tariff 
and  trade agreements concluded  by the Community (see  Arts  111  and  113  of the EEC 
Treaty) may  be  singled out in  this connection.  Whether such  international agreements 
entered into  by  the  Community rank  as  Community law  or as  international  law  in  the 
5 Community legal  system  has  not yet  be  settled conclusively.  In  view  of the  Council's 
practice  of implementing  international  agreements  by  means  of secondary  Community 
legal  acts  - regulations  and  decisions  in  particular  - it  must  be  assumed  that  the 
provisions  of  international  agreements  are  thereby  'transformed'  simultaneously  into 
Community law.  Such Community acts therefore are comparable to the rules which some 
of the Member States adopt when incorporating international agreements into their legal 
system. 
2.  Unwritten  sources 
The general principles of law are one unwritten source of Community law.  The existence 
and validity of general principles of law as  a form of Community law arise primarily from 
the  second  paragraph  of Article  215  of the  EEC Treaty,  which  refers  to  the  general 
principles  common  to  the  laws  of the  Member  States  in  the  case  of non-contractual 
liability.  On the other hand, Article 164 of the EEC Treaty, Article 136 of the Euratom 
Treaty and Article 31  of the ECSC Treaty entrust the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities with  the task of insuring that 'in the interpretation and application of this 
Treaty the law is observed'.  This wording shows that, in performing its task, the Court is 
not restricted to written Community law,  but also  has to insure that unwritten law,  and 
hence the general principles of Jaw  are observed.  In its  judgments, the Court also  has 
applied the general principles of law in  cases other than that referred to in the Treaty as 
non-contractua_l  liability  in  order  to  close  various  loopholes.  It  has  had  recourse, 
especially  in  the  field  of general  administrative  law  and  of fundamental  rights,  to the 
general principles of law  as a  source of Community law. 
Customary  law  is  another  unwritten  source  of  Community  law.  This  consists  of law 
resulting  from  established  practice,  and  the  ensuing  conviction  that  it  represents  the 
law.  For example, in Community law the right of the European Parliament to question the 
Council derives from  custom. 
The general rules of  international law may be considered to be only a supplementary source 
of Community law.  Because of their generality they are of significance only in connection 
with  the  development  of the  principles  embodied  in  Community  law,  and  as  specific 
expressions of the general principles of law.  The Court of Justice has recourse to them 
especially when applying the principles of proportionality, good faith and legal certainty. 
3.  Decisions  of the  representatives  of the  governments  of the  Member  States 
meeting  within  the  Council 
A  further source consists in the decisions of the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States  meeting  within  the  Council. 
The composition of the Council of the assembled representatives of the governments of the 
Member States is  identical with the individuals who also form the Community institution 
known as the Council.  The decisions taken by it are improperly called Council decisions. 
6 Technically,  they  are  governmental  agreements  and  hence  international  conventions. 
Unlike the acts of the Community institutions, they are not taken as a result of the exercise 
of powers conferred by  the Treaties but are based on the Member States' capacity to act 
under  international  law.  Whether  in  view  of  their  international  origin  they  can  be 
regarded  as  Community  Jaw  is  still  an  open question.  At all  events,  there  is  a  close 
connection  with  Community  law,  as  the  subject-matter  and  content  of such  'Council' 
decisions relate to Community matters.  This is  borne out by  the fact that such decisions 
are  as  a  rule  published  in  the  Official Journal of the  European  Communities. 
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Page 8 in the original is blank. II.  The  legal  nature  of the  European  Community 
In  the  years  immediately  following  the  foundation  of the  European  Community,  an 
attempt was made to model the legal nature of the Community on conventional inter-State 
associations. 
Some  regarded  the  Community  as  as  international  organization  of the  orthodox  kind, 
because it had been created by international treaties, and performed functions which were 
normally carried out by  international economic organizations. 
This,  however,  overlooked the  fact  that  the  Community Treaties were acts establishing 
independent communities with  their own  sovereign  rights  and  powers.  As  a  result  of 
these Treaties, the Member States have renounced part of their sovereignty in favour of the 
new  Community. 
Others saw this transfer of sovereignty by the Member States as a sign that the Community 
should  already be considered a  federal  entity.  This view,  however,  failed  to take into 
account  the fact  that sovereign  rights  had been conferred on the  Community only  in  a 
limited  number of areas.  Thus the  Community Jacks  both the universal  powers which 
characterize a  State, and the  right  to create new powers  (power-creating capacity). 
A classification of the Community under the existing forms of inter-State associations gives 
unsatisfactory results.  The Community's structural characteristics are such that it differs 
fundamentally from  other inter-State associations. 
Firstly, the list of tasks assigned to the Community is  more extensive than is normally the 
case  with  international  organizations.  Under  the  ECSC  Treaty,  the  Community  is 
responsible  for  the  common  administration  of the  European coal  and  steel  industries, 
which play a key role in the national economies.  Euratom has to carry out, in  common, 
tasks  in  research  into,  and  the  use  of,  nuclear energy.  Finally,  unlike  the  other two 
Communities whose purpose it is to integrate certain areas of the economy, the EEC has as 
its  task,  by  establishing  a  common  market  and  progressively  approximating  national 
economic policies,  to integrate' all  areas of the  economy. 
Secondly, Community law forms  a special, autonomous legal system,  independent of the 
legal systems of the Member States.  This legal system is endowed with its own institutions 
on which its own sovereign rights have been conferred.  As a result, in order to carry out 
their tasks, the institutions can adopt legal acts in  complete legal independence from  the 
9 Member States.  In order to take effect, Community law does not need to be incorporated 
into  national  law.  Even  in  the  Member  States,  it  is  applicable  in  its  capacity  as 
Community law. 
Thirdly,  Community  law  creates  rights  and  obligations  not  only  for  the  Community 
institutions  and  the  Member  States,  but  also  for  the  latter's  citizens.  This  effect  of 
Community law is called 'direct applicability'.  Individuals, therefore, are governed by (at 
least) two legal systems- national law and Community law.  In addition to his status as a 
citizen  of a  Member  State,  the  individual  thus  acquires  the  status  of a  citizen  of the 
European Community. 
Regulations have such an effect as a direct result of the Treaty.  The second paragraph of 
Article 189 of the EEC Treaty provides that a regulation 'shall be ... directly applicable in 
all  Member States'.  Rules which do not expressly give  rise  to rights and obligations for 
individuals are directly applicable where their structure and content so allow.  According 
to the case-law of the Court, this is so where the rule is sufficiently clear and precise, is not 
subject to any substantive condition, and does not require for its effectiveness any further 
Community  or  national  measures  which  are  within  the  discretion  of  the  Community 
institutions or of the  Member States. 
In  the light of these criteria, the Court first  of all  confirmed the direct applicability of a 
number of Treaty provisions.  In its judgment of 5 February 1963 in Case 26/62, van Gend 
en Loos, in which a Dutch firm invoked the standstill clause contained in Article 12 of the 
EEC Treaty  in  order to  have  an  increase  in  customs  duty  declared  illegal,  the  Court 
ascribed direct effect to that provision.  The judgment of 15 July 1964 in Case 6/64, Costa 
v ENEL, attributes such effect to Article 53  of the EEC Treaty, whereby Member States 
may not introduce any new restrictions on the right of establishment in  their territories of 
nationals of other Member States, and to Article 37, paragraph 2 of the EEC Treaty, which 
prohibits the introduction of any new measures discriminating against nationals of Member 
States. 
Two further judgments may be singled out from the subsequently very extensive case-law 
of the Court on the direct applicability' of Treaty provisions.  These are the judgments in 
Cases 2174  (Reyners) and 33/74 (van Binsbergen) which involved inter alia the question of 
the direct effect of Articles 52 and 59 of the EEC Treaty, according to which restrictions on 
the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services were to be abolished during 
the  transitional  period.  The special  feature  of these  two  cases was  the  fact  that  both 
Articles required the repeal of national laws by  the end of. the transitional period, which 
had not  entirely taken place.  The Court decided that the prohibition, underlying  both 
Treaty  provisions,  of the  unequal  treatment  of nationals  of other Member  States  was 
directly applicable since the end of the transitional period, as Article 52 and 59 contained 
obligations whose effects on the expiry of that period were well  defined. 
1 Translator's note :  The  terms  'direct  applicability'  and  'direct  effect'  though  strictly  speaking distinct,  have  in 
practice  been used interchangeably, even by  the  Court. 
10 Since  1970,  by  way of development of its case-law  on  the  direct applicability of Treaty 
rules,  the Court has  held  that every provision  of directives  and decisions  addressed  to 
States may be directly applicable under the same conditions as Treaty rules.  The decisive 
argument used by the Court is  that the effectiveness of a directive or decision would be 
diminished if nationals of Member States could not invoke the directive or decision before 
the courts and if national courts were not bound to apply it  as  part of Community law. 
In its judgment of 9 March 1978 in Case 106/77, Simmenthal II, the Court summed up its 
previous case-law on direct  applicability as  follows  : 
'Direct applicability  ... means that rules of Community law must be fully and uniformly 
applied in all the Member States from the date of their entry into force and for so long 
as they continue in force.  These provisions are therefore a direct source of rights and 
duties for all those affected thereby, whether Member States or individuals, who are 
parties to legal relationships under Community law.  This consequence also concerns 
any national court whose task it is as an organ of a Member State to protect, in a case 
within its jurisdiction, the rights conferred upon individuals by Community law'.  It is 
not  necessary  'for  such  courts  to  request  or await  the  actual  setting  aside  by  the 
national  authorities  empowered  so  to  act  of  any  national  measures  which  might 
impede the direct  and immediate application of Community rules'. 
Because of these unique features, the Community is  neither a conventional international 
organization nor an association of States but an independent sovereign association with its 
own sovereign rights and a legal system independent of the Member States, to which both 
the Member States and their nationals are subject in  the fields of activity assigned to the 
Community. 
This view is shared by the Court.  Its fundamental declarations on the legal nature of the 
Community are contained in  its  judgments in  Cases 26/62  (van  Gend en Loos) and 6/64 
(Costa v ENEL).  In  van  Gend en Loos it  was  held  that 
'The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of 
which  the States have limited their sovereign rights,  albeit within limited fields,  and 
the subjects of which comprise  not only  Member States but also  their nationals'. 
The judgment in  Costa v ENEL then omits any reference to international law: 
'By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created its own 
legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of 
the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply.  By 
creating  a  Community  of unlimited  duration,  having  its  own  institutions,  its  own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international 
plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from limitation of sovereignty or a 
transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited 
their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law 
which  binds  both their nationals and themselves'. 
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Page 12 in the original is blank. Ill.  Powers 
1.  Principle of limited individual powers 
The Treaties establishing the Community and their institutions do not confer upon them 
general powers but lay down in  the respective Articles individual powers to act.  This is 
shown particularly clearly by the first paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty and the 
first  paragraph of Article  161  of the  Euratom Treaty, which  empower the Council  and 
Commission  to  adopt  legal  acts  only  'in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  this 
Treaty'.  The first paragraph of Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty also confers such powers on 
the Commission only 'in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty'.  This principle is 
based on the concept of partial integration,  which forms the basis of the establishment of 
the  Communities.  According  to  this  concept,  integration  is  restricted  in  scope  to  the 
establishment of a  common  market and  the  progressive  approximation of the economic 
policies of the Member States.  All fields unconnected with these tasks remain within the 
competence of the Member States. 
According to the principle of limited individual powers, the Community institutions may 
neither legislate in fields which are not dealt with in the Treaties nor exceed their powers as 
specified in  the Treaties.  This, however, applies only to acts adopted by the institutions 
which are binding on the Member States or on citizens of the Common Market, for only 
such  acts  may restrict the sovereignty of the Member States. 
The  substantive  extent  of  the  individual  powers  varies  according  to  the  type  of  task 
entrusted to the Community.  It  is  very extensive, for example, in  the field  of common 
transport  policy,  where  any  appropriate  provisions  may  be  laid  down  (Art.  75  (1)  (c), 
EEC), of agricultural policy (Art. 43  (2), Art. 40 (3), EEC) and of freedom of movement 
(Art. 49, EEC).  On the other hand the freedom of action of the Communities and their 
institutions is restricted, for instance, in the field  of competition law (Arts 85 et seq., EEC) 
by  narrowly worded provisions. 
2.  Subsidiary powers 
The special  individual  powers contained in  the Community Treaties are not sufficient to 
attain the objectives specified in  the Treaties themselves (see in  particular, Arts 1, 2 and 3 
13 of the ECSC Treaty; Arts 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty and Arts 1 and 2 of the Euratom 
Treaty).  In order to make good this deficiency, Article 235 of the EEC Treaty and Article 
203  of the Euratom Treaty provide  that: 
'If action  by the Community should  prove  necessary  to attain·,  in  the course of the 
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this 
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously 
on  a  proposal  from  the  Commission  and  after  consulting  the  Assembly,  take  the 
appropriate measures'. 
The first  paragraph of Article 95  of the  ECSC Treaty confers  the  same  power on the 
Commission, but it is worded somewhat more narrowly in that it does not refer in a general 
manner to  necessary action  but specifically  to  the adoption of legal  acts. 
The purpose of such authorizations to act is  to create the necessary powers to take action 
which  is  not  expressly  provided  for  in  the  Treaties,  but  is  the  consequence  of,  or a 
precondition for, the attainment of a Treaty objective.  These provisions, however, do not 
contain any general authorizations which would enable tasks lying outside the objectives 
laid down in the Treaties to be performed.  They do not therefore apply, for example, to 
defence policy, foreign  policy - with  the exception of external economic policy - and 
most areas of cultural policy.  Nor do they confer on the Community any power-creating 
capacity, i.e. the Community institutions are not authorized to extend their own powers at 
the expense of the Member States. 
In  practice,  the  opportunities  afforded  by  the  subsidiary  powers  have  been  used  with 
increasing frequency.  This is  because  nowadays  the Community sets itself tasks  which 
were  not foreseen  when  the Treaties were  signed  and for  which  appropriate  individual 
powers are therefore lacking in  the Treaties.  Reference should be made in  particular to 
the  fields  of  environment  and  consumer  protection  and  to  the  numerous  research 
programmes undertaken outside Euratom since  1973.  Other important instances of the 
application of Article 235  of the EEC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 95  of the 
ECSC Treaty are the directives extending mutual recognition of degrees and diplomas to 
cover employees, the 1973  Regulation on the monetary fund and the 1975  Regulation on 
the  Regional  Fund. 
3.  Implied powers 
In addition to the subsidiary powers provided for in Articles 235 of the EEC Treaty, 203 of 
the Euratom Treaty and  the  first  paragraph of Article 95  of the  ECSC Treaty, powers 
which are not provided for in  writing are conferred on the Community institutions under 
the 'implied powers' doctrine.  According to this rule of international law- as applied to 
Community law- a power conferred on a Community institution authorizes it at the same 
time to take measures which are not expressly provided for in  the Treaties but which  are 
indispensable if the power is to be exercised effectively and usefully.  In contrast to Article 
235  of the  EEC Treaty, Article  203  of the  Euratom Treaty and  the  first  paragraph  of 
Article 95  of the ECSC Treaty, such powers are derived, not from Treaty objectives, but 
from  existing  Community  powers,  whose  exercise  they  facilitate.  This  doctrine  was 
14 expressly recognized by the Court in Case 8/55 (Fedechar) in which it held that Community 
measures based on implied  powers were admissible  under the  ECSC Treaty. 
In this case, the Federation Charbonnicre de Belgique brought an action for annulment of 
a decision of the High Authority (Commission) whereby the latter had unilaterally drawn 
up a price list for types of coal in which, for certain types of coal, prices had been fixed at a 
level  lower than  that sought  by  the applicant. 
The applicant argued, inter alia,  that 'it is clear from the Treaty that it is  not for the High 
Authority but  ... for the  producers themselves to draw up that  list'. 
With regard to this question of competence, the Court stated in its judgment that 'the rules 
laid down by an international treaty or a law presuppose the rules without which that treaty 
or  law  would  have  no  meaning,  or  could  not  be  reasonably  and  usefully  applied'. 
Moreover,  the  High  Authority  'enjoys  a  certain  independence  in  determining  the 
implementing measures necessary for  the attainment of the objectives referred to in  the 
Treaty'. 
A  specific instance of the application of the implied powers doctrine is  the derivation of 
Community powers to conduct external relations where these are not expressly provided for 
in the Treaties- as they are, for example, in the field of tariff and trade policy (Arts 111, 
113,  EEC), with  regard  to  relations with  international  organizations  (Art.  229,  second 
paragraph, EEC) and with  regard to the conclusion of association agreements (Art. 238, 
EEC). 
In  its  judgments in  Case 22/70  (AETR Agreement)  and Case 6/76  (Kramer), and in  its 
Opinion 1/76 on the conclusion of an agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for 
inland  waterway  vessels,  the  Court  held  that  the  Community  may  also  enter  into 
international commitments in  fields  in  respect  of which  no express  powers to conclude 
international  agreements  have  been  conferred  on  the  Community,  in  so  far  as  this  is 
necessary for the exercise of Community powers within its internal system.  The external 
powers therefore should be  regarded as  an  implied complement to the internal powers. 
In its judgment in Case 22/70 on the conclusion of the AETR Agreement, which governs 
the hours worked by persons engaged in international road transport, the Court derived the 
Community's power to conclude  this  international agreement  from  its  responsibility  for 
transport policy. 
In  its  Opinion  1/76,  the  Court  likewise  based  the  Community's power  to  conclude  an 
agreement establishing a European laying-up fund on its internal powers in  the transport 
policy sphere. 
Case  6/76  (Kramer)  concerned  the  competence  of the  Community  to  cooperate  with 
international bodies in  fixing  catch quotas in  sea fishing  and, if necessary, to enter into 
appropriate international commitments.  The Court derived the requisite external powers 
of  the  Community  from  its  responsibility  for  fisheries  products  under  the  common 
agricultural  policy. 
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Page 16 in the original is blank. IV.  Legal  acts 
1.  Legal acts  provided for in  the  Treaties 
In the Community Treaties the legal acts are listed which the Community institutions have 
at their disposal when carrying out the tasks conferred on them (Art. 189, first paragraph, 
EEC; Art. 161, first paragraph, Euratom; Art. 14, first paragraph, ECSC).  Although the 
acts enumerated and described therein are given different names in the EEC and Euratom 
Treaties on the one hand and in  the  ECSC Treaty on the other, they may be classified 
according  to their legal  effects and 'addressees' as  follows  : 
(a)  Regulations and general ECSC decisions 
A regulation is described in the second paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty and the 
second paragraph of Article  161  of the Euratom Treaty as  a legal  act which  has general 
application, is binding in  its entirety and is directly applicable in all  Member States.  The 
second  paragraph  of Article  14  the  ECSC Treaty  merely  provides  that  general  ECSC 
decisions  are  binding  in  their entirety.  A  more  precise  definition  has,  however,  been 
given by the Court of Justice, according to which general ECSC decisions also are generally 
and directly applicable  in  the  Member States. 
General  applicability  means  that  the  act  is  addressed  to  an  indeterminate  category  of 
individuals  and covers  a  multitude of unspecified  circumstances.  Binding  effect means 
that the acts confer rights and impose obligations on those to whom they are addressed. 
The statement that regulations and general ECSC decisions are binding in  their entirety 
serves to distinguish them from directives and ECSC recommendations, which are binding 
only  as  to the result to be  achieved. 
Direct applicability means that the legal effects occur without any intervention by Member 
States or their institutions.  Regulations and general ECSC decisions therefore apply not 
only to,  but also  in,  the  Member States. 
Because of their general and abstract character, regulations and general ECSC decisions 
have the same structure, as far as their content is concerned, as national laws.  Th~ Court 
therefore stated in Case 8/55 (Fedechar), with regard to general ECSC decisions, that such 
acts are 'quasi-legislative  measures'. 
17 In  their capacity  as  general  legislative  acts  of the  Community,  regulations  and  general 
ECSC decisions are instruments for securing the uniformity of  laws.  Regulations are used 
chiefly  to  establish  and  develop  market  organizations  for  agr.icultural  products.  Other 
important  ECSC  measures  have  also  been  adopted  in  the  form  of  regulations,  e.g. 
Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962 on restrictive practices and Regulation No 1612/68 of 
15  October 1968  on freedom  of movement. 
(b)  Directives and ECSC  recommendations 
Directives and ECSC recommentations are binding as  to the result to be achieved upon 
each  Member  State  and,  in  the  case  of  ECSC  recommendations,  on  citizens  of  the 
Common Market as well.  The Member States are obliged to take steps to ensure that the 
result is achieved.  The choice of the form of the measures and methods used in achieving 
the  results  required  under  Community  Jaw  is  left,  on the  other  hand,  to  the  national 
authorities (Art. 189, third paragraph, EEC; Art. 161, third paragraph, Euratom; Art. 14, 
third paragraph, ECSC). 
As rule, only the achievement of the actual result prescribed by Community law by means 
of  national  measures  gives  rise  to  direct  rights  and  obligations,  both  for  and  against 
Community citizens.  By  way  of exception,  however,  provisions  of directives  and ECSC 
recommendations  may also  be  directly  applicable. 
The main area of application of directives is the field of the approximation of  laws (see Art. 
100  of the  EEC Treaty). 
(c)  EEC and Euratom decisions,  Individual  ECSC decisions 
These  acts  are  directed  exclusively  at  individual  determinable  addressees.  Addressees 
may- according to the rules applicable in the EEC- be one or more Member States, or 
one more individuals in  the Member States.  Their content may be  expressed either in 
concrete or in abstract terms.  Decisions are binding in their entirety, and in this respect 
they differ from directives and ECSC recommendations.  According to the case-Jaw of the 
Court,  decisions  addessed to Member States are directly  applicable  in  the  same  way  as 
directives. 
Decisions are the usual  means whereby the Community institutions deal with  individual 
cases.  To this extent they are comparable to administrative measures taken pursuant to 
national law. 
(d)  EEC and Euratom recommendations, opinions 
The recommendations provided for in the EEC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty (Art. 189, 
fifth paragraph, EEC; Art. 161, fifth paragraph, Euratom) and the opinions common to all 
18 the Treaties (Art. 189, fifth paragraph, EEC; Art. 161, fifth paragraph, Euratom; Art. 14, 
fourth paragraph, ECSC) differ from other acts in  that they are not binding and therefore 
give rise to no legal obligations on the part of the addressees.  The addressees are for the 
most part Member States.  Only in a few cases specified in the Treaties may they also be 
addressed to individuals or undertakings (see Art. 92  (1) of the EliC Treaty and Art. 54, 
fifth  paragraph, of the ECSC Treaty). 
Recommendations  and  opinions  differ  from  each  other  in  that  recommendations  are 
generally  made  on  the  initiative  of the  Community  institution  issuing  them,  whereas 
opinions are delivered as  a  result of an outside initiative. 
The purpose of a recommendation is to suggest that the addressee take a specific course of 
action  without  legally  obliging  him  to  do  so.  An  opinion  either  contains  a  general 
assessment of certain facts  or prepares the ground for subsequent legal  proceedings (see 
Arts 169  and  170  of the EEC Treaty and  Arts 141  and 142  of the ECSC Treaty). 
The importance of recommendations and opinions is - because of their Jack  of binding 
force  - primarily political  and psychological. 
(e)  Adoption of legal  acts 
Several Community institutions work together when drawing up binding legal  acts. 
In  areas  covered  by  the  EEC  and  Euratom  Treaties,  the  Council  takes  decisions  in 
response to a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee (proposal procedure).  This procedure bears the 
imprint of cooperation between the Council and the Commision.  By virtue of its right of 
initiative the Commission draws up legislative  proposals which  it  submits to the Council 
together with a comprehensive explanatory memorandum.  This proposal serves as a basis 
for  the  measure  that  is  to  be  taken  and  determines,  in  particular,  its  content  and 
form.  Without a suitable proposal from the Commission, the Council is not permitted to 
legislate.  The Commission's right  to  make proposals ensures that Community interests 
are  safeguarded  during the legislative  process.  The Council's initiative  is  restricted  to 
requesting the Commission, under Article 152 of the EEC Treaty and Article 122 of the 
Euratom Treaty, to submit to it any proposals which the Council considers desirable for the 
attainment of the common objectives. 
If  a  Commission  proposal  is  before  the  Council,  the  latter  refers  it  for  consultation 
purposes to the European Parliament and, if necessary (e.g. under Art. 54 (2) of the EEC 
Treaty in  case of freedom of establishment), to the Economic and Social  Committee as 
well.  In some cases,  consultation is  expressly  provided for in  the Treaties and  is  hence 
obligatory, while in others it is opdonal, i.e. the Council decides to initiate the consultation 
procedure without being obliged to do so by  the Treaties. 
Apart from this right to be consulted under the Treaties, the European Parliament has no 
general  right  to  be  involved  in  the  decision-making  process.  Nor  was  this  situation 
changed  by  the  Joint  Declaration  of  the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the 
19 Commission of 4 March 1975, whereby a conciliation procedure was  agreed upon.  This 
procedure  is  designed  merely  to  bring  the  views  of the  Council  and  Parliament closer 
together before acts  having  financial  implications are adopted. 
The  end-product  of Parliament's cooperation is  its  opinion,  which· is  transmitted  to  the 
Council  and may also  contain  proposals for  amendments, although  these are not legally 
binding  on  the  Council when  it  takes  its  final  decision. 
Within  the  Council  the  proposal  is  discussed  by  working  parties  of experts.  Then the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives of the  Member States (COREPER - Comite 
des  Representants  permanents)  examines  the  proposal.  The  legislative  process  is 
concluded  from  the  substantive  point  of view  when  the  Council  takes its  decision. 
Implementing measures carrying acts adopted by the Council into effect are enacted by the 
Council and the Commission.  The Council reserves for itself the right to adopt any acts 
having  political  overtones. 
The Commission may take implementing measures after the Council has conferred on it the 
necessary powers (see  Art.  155,  fourth  subparagraph, of the EEC Treaty and Art.  124, 
fourth subparagraph, of the  Euratom Treaty). 
As a rule, however, the Council confers such powers on the Commission only through the 
agency  of  committees.  Under  the  so-called  Management  Committee  procedure,  a 
Management Committee consisting of representatives of the  Member States, which  has 
existed since the first regulations on agricultural market organizations were made in 1962, 
has to be heard prior to the adoption of implementing provisions.  The Commission may, 
irrespective of whether the Committee adopts a position or of the conclusions it reaches, 
immediately take enforceable measures.  Only if the Committee delivers an opinion which 
conflicts with the Commission's draft measures may the Council amend or repeal, within a 
period  of  one  month,  a  measure  decided  upon  by  the  Commission.  This  expedited 
procedure is used particularly in the case of the-often urgent- measures connected with 
day-to-day  management.  Where  sufficient  time  is  available  for  the  adoption  of 
implementing  measures,  the  Committee  on  Rules  procedure  is  initiated.  Under  this 
procedure,  in  order  to  adopt  the  necessary  implementing  measures,  the  Commission 
requires a favourable opinion from the so-called Committee on Rules.  Otherwise it must 
propose the intended measures to the Council, which has to take a decision within three 
months.  If the Council fails  to act before this period expires, the Commission again has 
the  authority to adopt the  implementing measures. 
Under the ECSC Treaty,  the power to adopt legal acts is largely vested in the Commission 
(formerly the High Authority), whereas the Council merely has a right of assent.  This 
enables the Council,  however,  to veto Commission measures. 
A number of articles of the ECSC Treaty also provide that, prior to the final adoption of a 
decision  by  the  Commission,  the  European  Parliament,  the  Economic  and  Social 
Committee, and the Advisory Committee (which exists only in the ECSC sphere) must be 
heard. 
20 Those  acts  which  have  no legal  effects - i.e.  recommendations  and opinions - may, 
according  to the EEC and  Euratom Treaties,  be  adopted by  both  the  Council  and  the 
Commission.  The Commission, in this, is not restricted solely to the cases provided for in 
the Treaties, but may make recommendations and deliver opinions whenever it considers it 
necessary (Art. 155, first paragraph, second subparagraph, EEC; Art. 124, first paragraph, 
second subparagraph,  Euratom). 
The  ECSC  Treaty  expressly  stipulates  that  an  opinion  may  be  delivered  only  by  the 
Commission. 
Under the first sentence of the first  paragraph of Article 191  of the EEC Treaty, the first 
sentence  of  the  first  paragraph  of  Article  163  of the  Euratom  Treaty,  and  the  third 
paragraph of Article 15 of the ECSC Treaty, after a decision has been taken, regulations, 
general  ESCS  decisions,  and  general  ECSC  recommendations  must  be  published  in 
accordance with  the legal  principle of publicity common to all  Member States.  Publica-
tion  is  effected in  the  Official Journal of the  European  Communities,  the first  edition of 
which  was  issued  on 20  April  1958  and which  also  replaces  the  Official Journal of the 
ECSC,  which  was  published  between  30  December  1952  and  19  April  1958.  It  is 
published  by  the  Office  for  Official  Publications  of  the  European  Communities  in 
Luxembourg. 
EEC and Euratom directives and decisions and individual decisions and recommendations 
of the ECSC do not need to be published under the Community Treaties.  This does not 
prevent the Community institutions, however, from publishing such acts also in the Official 
Journal.  Extensive use is  made of this possibility in  practice and directives and decisions 
addressed to Member States are, in  particular,  published in  the  Official Journal. 
The rights and obligations resulting from an act, i.e. its legal effects, arise only at the time 
of its  entry  into force. 
As regards regulations,  the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 191 of the EEC 
Treaty and the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 163 of the Euratom Treaty 
provide that they 'enter into force on the day specified in them or, in the absence thereof, 
on the twentieth day following their publication'.  The ECSC Treaty, on the other hand, is 
silent about the time of entry into force of general decisions and recommendations.  Accor-
ding to the fourth paragraph of Article 15 of the ECSC Treaty, this matter is to be settled 
by  implementing provisions to be adopted by the High Authority (Commission).  These 
provisions are contained in  High Authority Decision 22/60 of 7 September 1960, Article 6 
of which provides for a rule corresponding to the second sentence of the first paragraph of 
Article 191 of the EEC Treaty and the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 163 
of the Euratom Treaty. 
EEC and Euratom directives and decisions (Art. 191, second paragraph, EEC Treaty; Art. 
163,  second  paragraph,  Euratom)  and  individual  ECSC decisions  and  individual  ECSC 
recommendations  (Art.  15,  second  paragraph, ECSC) take effect  upon  notification. 
The act is  deemed to have been notified when the addressees are placed in  a position to 
take cognizance  thereof. 
21 2.  Other legal acts 
In  addition to these acts, which are listed and described in  the  Tr~aties, the Community 
institutions have  many other means of action  at  their disposal. 
The  following  deserve  to  be mentioned: 
- Acts which find  that certain steps towards integration provided for in  the Treaty 
have been taken (e.g. the finding that determines the transition from one stage to 
another under Article  8  (3)  of the  EEC Treaty); 
- Acts  adopting the  budget of the European Communities; 
- Acts  laying  down  the  rules  of  procedure  and  the  staff  organization  of  the 
Community  institutions; 
- Acts governing relations  with  non-member countries and  international organiza-
tions  (e.g.  trade agreements, association  agreements); 
- Acts  drawing  up  and  announcing  Community  programmes  of  action  - e.g. 
determining the stages of liberalization in the context of freedom of establishment 
(Art. 54(1), EEC) and of freedom to provide services (Art. 63(1), EEC) and, e.g., 
the Community Social  Action  Programme of 21  January 1974. 
Where  such  acts  are  to  have  legal  effects,  they  are  drawn  up  in  the  form  of  a 
decision.  Statements outlining programmes, on the other hand, are made in the form of a 
resolution. 
22 V.  The  relationship  between  Community  law  and  national  law 
The  statement  made  in  the  introduction  that  Community  law  is  an  independent  legal 
system,  distinct from  the legal systems of the Member States, raises the question of the 
relationship between Community law and national law.  This relationship is characterized, 
on the one hand, by  an interplay  between Community law and national law  and, on the 
other hand, by  a conflict  between Community law  and national law. 
1.  The interplay  between the legal systems 
An interplay between the legal systems takes place first of all where Community law refers 
to the legal systems of the Member States to complete one of its own requirements.  This 
is  the case,  for  example, in  Articles 48  and 52  of the EEC Treaty, whereby freedom of 
movement  and the right ·of  establishment are granted only  to nationals of the Member 
States, the criterion of nationality being determined by  the  law of the relevant Member 
States. 
In some cases Community law makes use of the legal institutions provided for by national 
law to supplement its own rules.  This is particularly evident in the case of the rules on the 
enforcement of judgments of the Court of Justice.  Under Article 187 of the EEC Treaty, 
the judgments of the Court of Justice are enforceable under the conditions laid down in 
Article 192 of that Treaty.  Article 192, for its part, refers expressly to the legal systems of 
the Member States and provides that enforcement is  to be governed by the rules of civil 
procedure in force  in the State in  the territory of which  it is  carried out. 
Finally, attention should be drawn to those cases in which, in order to give form to its own 
general  provisions,  Community  law  refers  to  all  the  legal  systems  of  the  Member 
States.  An example of this is provided by the second paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC 
Treaty, which, in order to give specific expression to the' concept referred to in its provision 
of liability,  refers  to the general principles common to the laws  of the  Member States. 
23 2.  Conflicts  between  Community law  and national law 
A  conflict  arises  between  Community  law  and  national  law  where  a  proviSion  of 
Community law creates direct rights and obligations for citizens of the Common Market, 
i.e. is directly applicable in the Member States, and is inconsistent in its substance with a 
rule of national law.  A conflict between Community law and national law can be resolved 
only if one of the  legal  systems withdraws so  that the other may  apply. 
Written Community law contains no express rule governing this set of circumstances.  In 
none of the Community Treaties is there a provision to be found which states, for example, 
that Community law  ranks above national law, or that it  is  inferior to  national  Jaw. 
Nevertheless, conflicts between Community law  and national law  can be  resolved in  the 
long  term only by giving  Community law  precedence over national  law. 
This  follows  from  the  fundamental  principle  of  Community  law:  the  ability  of the 
Communities  to  function.  The  Member  States  have  provided  the  Community  with 
legislative powers to enable it to perform its tasks.  The Community would be unable to 
perform those tasks if the acts adopted by it were not binding per se.  If  the Member States 
had the power to annul Community measures at any time by means of conflicting national 
measures, the continued existence of Community law, and hence of the Community itself, 
would be called into question.  A basic precondition for the existence and functioning of 
the Community is therefore the uniform and consistent application of Community law in all 
Member States.  Community law, however, has this effect only if it takes precedence over 
national  Jaw.  A  legal consequence of this  precedence is  the  fact  that any  provision  of 
national  law  which conflicts with  Community law  is  invalid. 
This principle is confirmed in  various provisions of the Community Treaties, in particular 
the second paragraph of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, the second paragraph of Article 
161  of the Euratom Treaty and the second paragraph of Article 14 of the ECSC Treaty, 
whereby  regulations  and  general  decisions  have  general  application.  They  have  this 
quality, however, only if they cannot be encroached upon by (partial) national law.  The 
same result ensues from the obligation of national courts to refer questions to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 177  of the EEC Treaty, Article  150 of the 
Euratom  Treaty  and  Article  41  of  the  ECSC  Treaty.  Under  the  preliminary  ruling 
procedure, the Court also has to decide on the validity of Community acts where this is at 
issue in proceedings before a national court.  In case of conflict, however, the question of 
the validity of Community law  can  arise  only if it  takes precedence over national law. 
The  Court of Justice  has  itself  acknowledged  the  primacy  of Community  law.  In  its 
landmark judgment of 15  July  1964  in  Costa v ENEL, it  held that: 
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'The integration into the laws of each Member States of provisions which derive from 
the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, make it. 
impossible  for  the States,  as  a  corollary,  to  accord  precedence  to a  unilateral  and 
subsequent measure over a  legal system accepted by them on a basis of reciprocity. 
Such  a  measure  cannot  therefore  be  inconsistent  with  that  legal  system.  The 
executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of 
the Treaty set out in Article 5 (2) and giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by 
Article 7. 
The obligations undertaken under the Treaty establishing the Community would not 
be  unconditional,  but  merely  contingent,  if  they  could  be  called  in  question  by 
subsequent legislative  acts of the signatories  .... 
The precedence of Community law  is  confirmed by  Article  189....  This  provision, 
which  is  subject  to  no  reservation,  would  be  quite  meaningless  if  a  State  could 
unilaterally nullify its effects  by  means of a  legislative  measure which could prevail 
over Community law. 
It  follows  from  all  these  observations  that  the  law  stemming  from  the Treaty,  an 
independent source of law,  could not, because of its  special  and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of 
its character as  Community law  and without the legal.basis of the Community itself 
being called into question'. 
The  Court  in  its  subsequent  judgments  has  consistently  confirmed  the  precedence  of 
Community law.  It has, in  fact,  developed it  further in one respect.  While in  Costa v 
ENEL it  had  to consider only the question of the  precedence of Community law  over 
subsequent national (ordinary) law, in Case 11/70 (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft) and 
Case 4/73  (Nold) it confirmed the principle of primacy also in  respect of the relationship 
between Community law and national constitutional law. 
National  courts  have  in  principle  concurred  with  this  view  of  the  Court.  In  The 
Netherlands,  no  difficulties  can  arise  anyway,  since  the  precedence of Treaty law  over 
national statutes is expressly provided for in  the Dutch constitution (Arts 66 and 67).  In 
the other Member States, the principle of the precedence of Community law over ordinary 
national  laws  has  been  acknowledged  in  the  same  way  by  the  national  courts.  The 
constitutional courts of the  Federal  Republic of Germany and  Italy,  however,  make  an 
exception  to  this  principle  where  Community  law  conflicts  with  constitutional  guaran-
tees.  In the view of these courts, a conflict in  such cases should be resolved in  favour of 
the fundamental  rights. 
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Page 26 in the original is blank. VI.  Fundamental  rights 
1.  Existence of fundamental rights  in  the  law of the  European  Community 
Although the Community Treaties contain neither a catalogue of fundamental rights nor a 
general  fundamental  rights  clause  - as  was  provided,  for  example,  in  the  Treaty 
establishing the European Defence Community of 27 March 1957- individual provisions 
are  included  in  the  Treaties  which  correspond  substantively  to  certain  constitutional 
guarantees afforded by  Member States. 
This  is  true  in  particular  of the  numerous  prohibitions  on  discrimination  which  give 
expression to specific aspects of the general principle of equality.  Worthy to note  are, 
inter  alia,  Article  7  of the  EEC Treaty  prohibiting  any  discrimination  on  grounds  of 
nationality,  Articles  48,  52  and  60  of the  EEC Treaty placing citizens  of the  Common 
Market  on  an  equal  footing  in  the  fields  of the  right  to  employment,  the  right  of 
establishment and freedom to provide services, and Article 119 on equal pay for men and 
women. 
The Community rules creating the four fundamental freedoms of the Community, which 
guarantee fundamental  freedoms  in  professional  life,  may  be  regarded as constituting a 
Community fundamental  right  to  freedom  of movement and  freedom  to  engage  in  any 
trade or profession.  These rules are the provisions on freedom of movement for workers 
(Art. 48,  EEC), freedom of establishment (Art. 52,  EEC), freedom  to provide services 
(Art. 59,  EEC) and the free  movement of goods  (Art. 9,  EEC). 
The constitutionally guaranteed right to economic liberty,  in  the sense of entrepreneurial 
freedom  of action,  is  laid  down  in  Community law  in  the Treaty objectives,  and  finds 
explicit expression above all  in the provisions on freedom of competition (Art. 85, EEC), 
goods  and  movement of capital  (Arts 9  and  67,  EEC), establishment  (Art.  52,  EEC), 
services  (Art. 59,  EEC) and movement (Art.  48,  EEC). 
Finally,  other  areas  of  fundamental  rights  are  expressly  acknowledged  in  individual 
provisions  of the  Community Treaties.  These include: 
- the  right  of association  (Art.  118,  first  paragraph,  EEC;  Art.  48,  first  paragraph, 
ECSC); 
27 - the  right  of petition (Art. 48,  second  paragraph, ECSC); 
- the right to protection for business and professional secrecy (Art. 214, EEC; Art. 194, 
Euratom; Art. 47,  second  and  fourth  paragraphs,  ECSC). 
These guarantees of fundamental rights enshrined in  the primary legislation have, in some 
cases, been given practical expression in  rules of secondary legislation, and in others, been 
extended  even  further.  Most  noteworthy  are  the  provision  of Regulation  No  1612/68 
guaranteeing the right of employees to join a trade union and the directives guaranteeing 
free  access  to  schools  and other educational establishments. 
These guarantees embodied in  Community law as  represented by the Community Treaties 
and a number of supplementary rules of secondary legislation nevertheless cover only some 
of the  safeguards  built  into  Member  States'  constitutions.  Since  Community  law  can 
enforce its claim to precedence over national law only if it is also able, without the help of 
an outside agency, to afford a protection of fundamental rights which is equivalent to that 
afforded by  national constitutions, there is  a need for a protection of fundamental rights 
going beyond  the  guarantees provided for  in  the Treaties. 
The case-law of the Court of Justice takes this into account.  In the beginning the Court 
rejected  all  arguments  based  on  fundamental  rights,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  not 
empowered to  deal with  questions which  fell  within  the ambit of national constitutional 
law.  Since  1969,  however,  it  has  recognized  the  existence  of  a  separate  system  of 
protection of fundamental  rights enshrined in  Community law. 
This  line  of  cases  started  with  the  judgment  of  12  November  1969  in  Case  29/69 
{Stauder).  The case concerned the question whether the sale of 'welfare butter' could be 
made conditional on divulging the names of beneficiaries to retailers.  This was stipulated 
in  the German and Dutch versions of the disputed decision, whereas the other language 
versions  required only  that the coupons bear some  reference  to  the beneficiary. 
After  it  had  first  interpreted  the  provision  at  issue  as  not  requiring  the  disclosure  of 
beneficiaries' names, the Court concluded that the provision contained 'nothing capable of 
prejudicing the fundamental human rights enshrined in  the general principles of Commu-
nity law  protected by the Court'. 
The Court hereby acknowledged for the first time that fundamental rights are integral part 
of  the  general  principles  of  the  Community  legal  system.  The  case  still  left  open, 
however, the question of the manner in  which  the substance of these general principles 
should  be determined. 
The first indication of this was given in the Court's judgment in Case 11n0 (Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft).  In this  case  the  Court had to consider  a  Community rule  which 
provided  that  the  grant  of  an  export  licence  for  certain  agricultural  products  was 
conditional on the lodging of a deposit, which was forfeited in the event of failure to export 
the goods during the period of validity of the licence.  The plaintiff argued that the system 
of deposits  was  contrary  to  the  fundamental  right  of  property  and  the  principle  of 
proportionality. 
28 In  its decision, the Court first  of all  confirmed its  finding  in  the Stauder judgment of the 
existence,  in  the  Community  legal  system,  of general  principles  of law  regarding  the 
protection of fundamental rights, and went on to state that 'the protection of such rights, 
whilst  inspired  by  the constitutional  traditions common  to  the  Member States,  must  be 
ensured within  the framework  of the structure and objectives of the  Community'. 
The Court thus made it  clear that, in  formulating fundamental Community rights, it  has 
recourse  to the common bases of the  constitutions of the Member States, but does not 
judge the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State in the light 
of the constitution of that State or of the  principles of its  constitutional structure. 
The judgment of 14 May 1974 in Case 4173 (Nold) ~onsolidated this case-law.  In this case, 
a  coal  wholesaler - the  Nold undertaking - brought an action,  based  on the right  of 
property protected by  the German constitution, for annulment of a decision of the High 
Authority (Commission) laying down minimum sales conditions in  order to obtain direct 
supplies  of  coal  from  producers.  In  addition  to  the  already  familiar  principles,  this 
judgment  contains  two  new  aspects :  firstly,  the  Court  states  that  it  'cannot  uphold 
measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the 
constitutions of those  States';  secondly,  it  points  out that international  treaties for  the 
protection of human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they 
are signatories can supply guidelines which  should be  followed  within  the framework of 
Community law. 
The Court expressed this still very generally worded statement in  more precise terms 
in  Case 36175  (Rutili) in  the light of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  (ECHR)  of 4  November  1950,  which 
France,  the  last  Community  country  to  do  so,  ratified  on  3  May  1974.  In  this 
judgment,  the  Court  recognized  that  the  limitations  placed  on  the  powers  of the 
Member States in  respect of aliens are a specific manifestation of a general principle 
enshrined in the ECHR and in the fourth protocol thereto, which provide, in identical 
terms, that 'no restrictions in the interests of national security or public safety shall be 
placed on the rights secured  ... other than such as are necessary for the protection of 
those  interests in  a  democratic society'. 
In  subsequent years,  the  Court was  to  refer  repeatedly to these  principles  in  order to 
develop  fundamental  rights  in  the  Community  context.  In  addition  to  the  above-
mentioned right of property, general right of privacy, economic and professional freedom 
and  the  principle  of proportionality,  which  formed  the  subject  matter of the  Stauder, 
Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft  and  Nold  judgments,  the  Court  has  recognized  the 
freedom of association, the freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs,  and a  general 
principle of equality,  as  the Community's own fundamental  rights. 
Apart  from  these  specific  fundamental  rights,  it  also  has  evolved  a  number  of prin· 
ciples.  These include : 
- the principle of the legality of administration; 
- the principle of proportionality; 
- the  need for  legal  certainty; 
- the  protection of good faith; 
29 - the protection of legitimate  expectations; 
- the protection of vested  rights; 
- the principle of audi et alteram partem. 
The  most  important judgment on  fundamental  rights  was  delivered  in  1979  in  Case  44/79 
(Hauer  v Land Rheinland-Pfalz).  Following  a  detailed  examination  of the  situation  on  the 
market in  wine,  the  Court held  that the  restriction  on  the  use  of property imposed  by  the 
temporary prohibition on the new  planting of vines was justified in the general interest of the 
Community and did not undermine the substance of the right of  ownership. In this judgment, the 
Court confirmed all  of its earlier decisions on fundamental  rights  and observed that not only 
Protocol No 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights but also the legal systems of all 
the Member States distinguish clearly between restrictions on the use of property which may be 
essential  in  the general interest and the  deprivation of the right of ownership  as  such. 
In spite of this extensive  case-law on the issue  of fundamental  rights,  it  should  not  be 
forgotten that there are limits to this procedure for the creation of 'European fundamental 
rights' by the Court of Justice.  The Court is able to continue giving specific expression to 
the general principles of law only if a matter is referred to it which provides it with suitable 
opportunity.  Even so, the Court is restricted to the case in point and is therefore scarcely 
in  a position to define the content and scope of the protection of fundamental  rights in 
sufficient  breadth and depth. 
The German  Federal Constitutional Court regarded the  resulting  legal  uncertainty as  a 
ground  for  stating,  in  its  decision  of 29  May  1974,  that  the  protection  of  German 
fundamental  rights  against  infringements  by  the  Community was  a  matter for  German 
judicial bodies so long as  the Community did  not itself have  at  its disposal  a system of 
protection of individual rights corresponding to the Basic Law.  The Federal Constitution-
al  Court  nevertheless  restricted  this  interpretation  in  its  decision  of 25  July  1979  by 
expressly pointing out that the competence it had claimed in its decision of 29 May 1974 to 
review Community law in  the light of fundamental rights did not extend to Treaty law. 
The  Italian  Constitutional  Court  expressed  similar  views  on  the  same  subject  in  its 
judgment No  183  of 18-27  December 1973. 
How far national constitutional courts are to maintain their positions will depend to a large 
extent  on  progress  made  in  the  process  of  integration,  especially  in  the  field  of  the 
protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Community.  The  Joint  Declaration  by  the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 5 Apri11977 was a major step in 
the right direction.  In its declaration, the Community institutions solemly declared their 
respect for  fundamental  rights  in  the following  words: 
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'The European Parliament, the Council  and the  Commission, 
Whereas  the  Treaties  establishing  the  European  Communities  are  based  on  the 
principle  of respect for  the law; 
Whereas, as the Court of Justice has recognized, that law comprises, over and above 
the rules embodied in  the Treaties and secondary Community legislation, the general 
principles  of law  and in  particular the fundamental  rights,  principles and rights  on 
which  the constitutional law of the  Member States is  based; Whereas, in particular, all the Member States are Contracting Parties to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November  1950, 
have  adopted the  following  declaration: 
1.  The  European  Parliament,  the  Council  and  the  Commission  stress  the  prime 
importance  they  attach  to  the  protection  of fundamental  rights,  as  derived  in 
particular  from  the  constitutions  of  the  Member  States  and  the  European 
Convention for  the  Protection of Human Rights  and  Fundamental Freedoms. 
2.  In  the  exercise  of their  powers  and  in  pursuance of the  aims  of the  European 
Communities they  respect  and  will  continue to respect  these  rights'. 
This declaration is  not a Community legal act which individuals may invoke against the 
Community.  It is more of a declaration of intent.  It has legal signifiance, however, as a 
universal  recognition  of  fundamental  rights  by  the  Community  institutions.  But  its 
importance resides above all in the fact that it sums up, confirms and generalizes the results 
achieved by jurisprudence in  guaranteeing fundamental rights.  It  also demonstrates the 
complete agreement of the Community institutions on the approach to be adopted to the 
question of fundamental  rights within  the Community. 
2.  The  'addressees' of fundamental rights 
The  guarantees  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Community  legal  system  are  primarily 
designed  to  protect  citizens  of the  Common  Market  against  possible  infringements  of 
fundamental  rights  by  the  Community institutions. 
When  legislative  and  decision-making  powers  were  conferred  on  the  institutions,  the 
possibility also arose that the exercise of these powers might lead to infringements of the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual.  In view of the tasks performed by the 
Community  institutions,  this  concerns  principally  the  fundamental  rights  of industrial 
property,  the  freedom  to  engage  in  a  trade  or  profession,  equality,  the  principle  of 
proportionality, legal  protection and  procedural safeguards. 
In  addition,  however,  the  Member  States  must  also  be  regarded  as  'addressees'  of 
fundamental rights,  since, in view of the direct effect of Community law, the possibility 
cannot  be  ruled  out that fundamental  rights  defined  and protected by  Community law 
might  be infringed by  measures taken by  the Member States.  In practice, this problem 
has risen in particular where Member States have taken the opportunity afforded them by 
Treaty reservations to restrict, on the basis of requirements in the fields of public order or 
security,  the  rights  flowing  from  freedom  of movement  for  workers  and  freedom  of 
establishment. 
Community citizens have on a number of occasions pleaded that measures taken as a result 
of this possibility, such as, for example, expulsion orders, and the ensuing loss of freedom 
or restrictions on the right of residence constitute an  unlawful  encroachment on a  legal 
31 position  protected  by  Community  law.  In  its  judgments - especially  in  Cases  36nS 
(Rutili), 4tn4 (van Duyn), 4BnS  (Royer) and Sn7  (Sagulo) - the Court stressed  two 
aspects of this  problem:  on the one hand, it recognized the need for Member States to 
determine  the  requirements  of public  policy  and  public  security  within  their  territory 
according to their own political and ethical standards, while on the other hand it indicated 
clearly that this power is  limited by Community law and hence also by the Community's 
own  fundamental  rights.  As  a  result,  the  fundamental  rights  and  freedoms  of  the 
Community legal system must also be taken into account by the Member States in their 
dealing with  Community citizens. 
3.  Legal protection against  infringements of fundamental  rights 
Even a protection of fundamental rights, comprehensive in terms of its content, is of no use 
to the individual if there is no procedure for dealing with infringements of such rights.  In 
keeping  with  the  lack  of a  catalogue  of fundamental  rights,  the  Community  Treaties 
provide  for  no  specific  legal  remedy  against  infringements  of fundamental  rights.  In 
particular,  there  is  no  scope  for  lodging  individual  complaints.  Instead,  Community 
citizens can defend themselves against infringements of their fundamental rights only by 
making use of the possibilities  for  actions in  general terms. 
32 VII.  The  system  of legal  protection 
1.  Jurisdiction and functions of  the Court of  Justice of  the European Communities 
The Treaties establishing  the  Communities laid  down  in  identical  provisions  (Art.  164, 
EEC;  Art.  136,  Euratom  and  Art.  31,  ECSC)  the  general  tasks  of  the  Court  of 
Justice.  These consist  in  the interpretation,  application  and development of Community 
law.  The respective individual powers are exhaustively enumerated in  individual articles 
of the Treaties. 
Thus the  Court has  jurisdiction in: 
- Actions brought by Member States against the Council and Commission or by one 
of the latter institutions against  the  other (Art.  173,  first  paragraph, EEC; Art. 
146, Euratom; Art. 38, ECSC: Art. 175, first paragraph, EEC: Art. 148, Euratom; 
Art. 35,  ECSC); 
- Actions brought by  the Commission or by  Member States for an infringement of 
the  Treaties  by  a  Member  State  (Arts  169,  second  paragraph  and  170,  first 
paragraph, EEC; Art.  142,  Euratom; Art.  33,  ECSC); 
- Actions  brought  by  individuals  against  the  Community  (Arts  173,  second  para-
graph and 175, third paragraph, EEC; Arts 146 and 148, Euratom; Arts 35 and 38, 
ECSC); 
- Actions for  damages brought against the  Community (Art.  178,  EEC; Art.  151, 
Euratom; Art. 34,  second  paragraph,  ECSC); 
- Disputes  between  the  Community  and  its  servants  (Art.  179,  EEC;  Art.  152, 
Euratom); 
- Disputes  between  Member States  referred  under special  agreements  (Art.  182, 
EEC; Art.  153,  Euratom:  Art.  42,  ECSC); 
- Preliminary ruling on proceedings initiated by national courts (Art. 177, EEC; Art. 
150,  Euratom:  Art.  41,  ECSC); 
- Opinions  as  to  the  compatibility  of international  agreements  concluded  by  the 
Community with  the  Community Treaties (Art.  228  (1),  second  subparagraph, 
EEC); 
- In  the  ECSC,  the  Court  also  participates  in  the  procedure  for  making  minor 
amendments to  the  Treaty (Art. 95,  fourth  paragraph,  ECSC). 
This survey of the powers of the Court of Justice shows that, as the only judicial body at 
Community level, the Court has to intervene in  various fields of law.  It thus performs a 
multitude of functions which, in the legal systems of the Member States, are divided among 
various branches of the judiciary, namely constitutional courts, administrative courts, civil 
courts  and industrial  tribunals. 
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(a)  Action  for  annulment (Art.  173,  EEC; Art.  146,  Euratom;  Art.  33,  ECSC) 
An action for annulment is brought with a view to obtaining a declaration of nullity by  the 
Court cancelling binding legal  acts  of the Community institutions. 
(aa)  Action for annulment brought by the  Community institutions and the  Member States 
The right of the Member States, the Council and the Commission to bring an action stems 
from the first paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty and the first paragraph of Article 
146  of the  Euratom Treaty. 
Only binding legal acts may form the subject matter of  an action.  Consequently, the action 
lies  mainly  against regulations,  directives and decisions. 
The causes of  action are listed exhaustively in the above-mentioned provisions.  An action 
for  annulment  may  accordingly  be  brought  only  on  grounds  of  lack  of  competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of primary or secondary 
legislation,  or  misuse  of powers.  The  need  for  legal  protection  is  assumed  in  such 
cases.  This means that the Member States may bring an action against an act even where 
it  is  not  addressed  to them and does  not concern  them  directly. 
If an infringement of Community law is established, the Court declares the act concerned 
to be void with retrospective effect pursuant to Article 174 of the EEC Treaty and Article 
147  of the Euratom Treaty. 
(bb)  Actions for annulment brought by Community citizens 
The right of Community citizens to institute proceedings stems from  the second paragraph 
of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty and the second paragraph of Article 146 of the Euratom 
Treaty.  Unlike the Member States and the Community institutions, Community citizens 
may bring an action for annulment only against a decision addressed to them or against a 
decision which, although addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to 
the  applicant.  This  means  that  Community  citizens  cannot  bring  actions  for  the 
annulment of regulations and directives. 
Otherwise  there  are  no  differences  as  regards  the  causes  of action  and  effects  of the 
judgment compared with actions for annulment brought by Member States or Com'munity 
institutions. 
34 (cc)  Special features  of the  ECSC Treaty 
Only the Council and the Member States, but not the Commission, may bring an  action 
under the  first  paragraph of Article 33  of the ECSC Treaty. 
Actions may  be  brought against  ECSC decisions  and recommendations. 
Only undertakings and associations may bring an  action  under the second paragraph of 
Article  33  of the  ECSC Treaty.  With  regard  to  the  subject  matter  of the  action,  a 
distinction is made between individual decisions or recommendations on the one hand, and 
general  decisions  or recommendations on the other.  An action  for  annulment may be 
brought against the latter only on the ground of a misuse of powers affecting the applicant. 
(b)  Action  for failure  to  act 
The  action  for  failure  to  act  complements  the  legal  protection  afforded  against  the 
Community  institutions  by  also  enabling  claimants  to  proceed  against  the  unlawful 
ommission of a  Community act. 
(aa)  Actions brought by Member  States  and the  Community institutions 
Pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 175 of the EEC Treaty and the first paragraph of 
Article 148  of the Euratom Treaty, the right to  bring an  action  is  vested not only in  the 
Member States but also in  the 'other institutions of the Community', i.e. -in  contrast to 
the action for annulment - in  the European Parliament as  well. 
Before the action may be brought, however, a preliminary procedure must be carried out in 
which the complainant has to call upon the institution concerned to act.  Only if no action 
is taken in response to this request within a period of two months may the action for failure 
to act  be brought. 
The subject matter of the  action  is  an  application  for  a  finding  that  the  Council or the 
Commission  has  failed,  in  violation  of the  Treaty,  to  take  a  decision.  This  finding  is 
relatively easy to make where the Treaty provides for specific action by the Council or the 
Commission at a certain time or in certain circumstances.  Difficulties arise, however, in 
cases in  which the action is  left to the discretion of the institution concerned.  An action 
for failure to act lies in such cases only if it is established that the failure to act is due to an 
abuse of a  discretionary power. 
A  special  need for  legal  protection is  not required. 
The final  judgment merely establishes  the  illegality  of the specific  failure  to  act.  The 
Court  is  not  empowered  to  order  in  its  judgment  that  the  necessary  measure  be 
taken.  Article  176 of the EEC Treaty and Article  149  of the Euratom Treaty require, 
however,  that the losing  party take  the  measures  necessary  to  comply with  the Court's 
judgment. 
35 (bb)  Actions brought by Community citizens 
The right of inviduals to bring an action is  provided for in the seco"nd  paragraph of Article 
175  of the EEC Treaty and the second paragraph of Article  148 of the Euratom Treaty. 
In this case also, the preliminary procedure .must be carried out.  The subject mal/er of an 
action for  failure  to act brought by  an individual is,  according to the third paragraph of 
Article  175  of the  EEC Treaty and  the  third  paragraph of Article  148  of the  Euratom 
Treaty, limited to an application for a declaration that a Community institution has failed, 
in violation of the Treaty, to address an act to the wmplainant.  In addition, therefore, to 
opinions and recommendations, which  are expressly excluded, directives and regulations 
are also ruled out, since directives may be addressed only to Member States and regulations 
apply to an  indeterminate number of individual cases.  Hence the only eligible act  is  a 
decision  addressed to the  complainant. 
With a regard to the effect of the judgment, the same remarks may be made as in the case of 
an  action  for  failure  to act  brought by Member States and Community institutions. 
(cc)  Special features  of tire  ECSC Treaty 
The only special feature of the ECSC Treaty compared with the two other Treaties is  the 
fact that, under the ECSC Treaty, the action for failure to act is an action for the annulment 
of the Commission's decision not to adopt the act in  question (Art. 35).  Consequently, 
the details regarding the 'action for failure to act' provided for in  the ECSC Treaty are the 
same as  for  the  action  for  annulment dealt  with  above. 
(c)  Action  for Infringement of the Treaties 
An action for infringement of the Treaties is designed to establish that Member States have 
failed  to fulfil  obligations placed on them by Community law.  This action provides the 
Commission with an effective means of fulfilling its function as  'guardian of the Treaties'. 
(aa)  EEC and Euratom  Treaties  (Arts  169-171,  EEC; Arts. 141-143,  Euratom) 
Only  the  Commission  and  the  Member  States  are  entitled  to  bring  an  action  for  an 
infringement of the Treaties. 
Before the matter can be brought before the Court, however, a preliminary procedure must 
be carried out.  In the case of an action  brought by the Commission,  the latter must first 
address itself to the Member State accused of having infringed the Treaty so that it may 
answer the accusation.  This procedure has proved to be very useful in practice.  It helps 
to  shed  light  on  the  facts,  which  arc  frequently  very  complex,  and  hence  to  avoid 
unnecessary legal proceedings.  Only if the Commission is  still convinced that the Treaty 
36 has been infringed docs it  deliver a reasoned opinion calling upon the State concerned to 
remove the cause of the infringement within a certain period.  If the Member State does 
not comply with this opinion, the Commission may  bring the matter before the Court of 
Justice  with  a  request that the latter find  that the  Member State  has  failed  to  fulfil  an 
obligation  under the Treaty. 
In the event of an  action being brought by one Member State againstanother Member State 
on  the  ground of an  infringement  of the  Treaties,  the  Commission  must  likewise  first 
consider the matter.  The procedure is  that the Member State notifies the Commission of 
its  intention  to  bring an  action  and of the grounds which,  in  its  opinion,  constitute  an 
infringement of the Treaty, whereupon the Commission initiates the same procedure as  it 
does prior to one of its own actions against a Member State.  In particular, it must deliver 
a reasoned opinion in this case also.  Only where this does not take place within a period 
of three months may the Member State bring an action against the other Member State in 
the absence of a  reasoned opinion of the Commission. 
The subject matter of the action for an infringement of the Treaties is the application by the 
Commission or the Member State for a finding that the Member State has failed to fulfil 'an 
obligation  under this Treaty'. 
Obligations under the Treaty are not only obligations stemming from primary Community 
legislation but also those which are imposed on Member States by secondary Community 
legislation. 
Member  States  often ·seek  to  justify  themselves  by  claiming  that  the  Community  or 
Member States have, for their part, infringed the Treaties, or refer to domestic political or 
legal  difficulties.  The Court of Justice  has  always  rejected such  arguments and  rigidly 
upheld  the  rules  and procedures embodied in  Community law. 
If  the Court upholds the application by the Commission or the Member State and finds that 
the Treaty has been infringed, the State concerned has to take the measures necessary to 
comply with the Court's judgment (Art. 171,  EEC; Art. 143,  Euratom).  The judgment 
itself can,  on the  other hand,  neither formally  oblige  the  Member State to rectify  the 
unlawful state of affairs nor itself undertake to abolish the measure complained of.  Even 
penalties cannot be imposed in such circumstances.  Past experience has shown that, as a 
rule,  Member States take the measures  necessary to remedy the infringement, although 
owing to political or technical difficulties- e.g. where special legislation has to be passed 
.:__this often takes some time.  An exception was the recent case between France and the 
United  Kingdom  involving  French  measures  restricting  imports  of British  mutton  and 
Iamb,  which  France  deliberately  maintained  even  after  the  Court  had  delivered  its 
judgment. 
(bb)  The  ECSC Treaty  (Art.  88,  ECSC) 
In contrast to the rules c.r;>ntained  in the other Community Treaties, the first paragraph of 
Article 88  of the ECSC Treaty provides that infringements of the Treaty are established 
directly  by  the  Commission  after  the  Member  State  concerned  has  been  given  an 
37 opportunity to submit its  comments.  The Member State may  then  appeal  against  the 
Commission's decision to the Court of Justice. 
A further difference is that penalties may be imposed, payments due to the Member State 
in  question  suspended  and  protective  measures  taken  (see  Art.  88,  third  paragraph, 
subparagraphs (a)  and (b) of the  ECSC Treaty). 
(d)  Preliminary ruling procedure (Art. 177,  EEC; Art.  ISO,  Euratom; Art. 41,  ECSC) 
This procedure is  intended to ensure uniform application of Community law by national 
courts.  Although the application of Community law in individual cases is  a  matter for 
national courts, the interpretation and examination of the validity of Community laws are 
the preserve of the Court of Justice. 
(aa)  Reference  via  the  national courts 
The national court hearing the action is alone empowered to make a reference to the Court 
of Justice.  Neither litigants nor other parties to the proceedings may themselves request 
the Court to give  a  preliminary ruling. 
Under the EEC and Euratom Treaties, it  is  in principle left to  the discretion  of the courts 
whether or not to make a  reference.  An obligation to make a reference is  imposed only 
on those courts against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law (Art. 
177, third paragraph, EEC; Art. 150, third paragraph, Euratom).  Under Article 41  of the 
ECSC Treaty,  on the other hand,  there  are no exceptions to the obligation  to make a 
reference. 
Pursuant  to  the  second  paragraph  of Article  177  of the  EEC Treaty  and  the  second 
paragraph of Article 150 of the Euratom Treaty, national courts may raise, as the subject 
matter of a reference, the question whether a provision of  secondary Community legislation 
which it has to apply is  valid,  and/or how such secondary Community legislation and the 
Community  Treaties  should  be  interpreted.  Under  Article  41  of  the  ECSC  Treaty, 
however, only an examination of the validity of  acts of  the Council and of  the Commission is 
admissible.  The  validity  of  provisions  of  the  Community  Treaties  may  under  no 
circumstances  be examined in  preliminary ruling  procedures. 
(bb)  Relevance of the  decision 
A further precondition for the reference is  that the question to the Court must be relevant 
to the proceedings pending before the national court (see Art. 177, second paragraph, of 
the EEC Treaty and Art. 150, second paragraph, of the Euratom Treaty).  This is a matter 
for the national court to decide and needs no further substantiation.  Since the relevance 
of the question to the decision is a matter for the national legal system, the Court of Justice 
is  not empowered to examine  the grounds for  the reference or their appropriateness. 
38 (cc)  Effects of the preliminary ruling 
The judgment given  by  the  Court of Justice  under the  preliminary  ruling  procedure is 
binding, as regards the validity or the interpretation of the provisions of Community law at 
issue, only on the national courts which have to reach a decision in the national proceedings 
in  question.  In  addition,  however,  such  a  judgment has  far-reaching practical implica-
tions.  Thus it is,  for example, hardly conceivable that an authority acting in conformity 
with its duty will still apply a provision of Community law despite the fact that it has been 
declared  invalid  by  the  Court of Justice. 
(e)  Liability for  damage 
(aa)  EEC and  Euratom  Treaties  (Art.  215,  EEC; Art.  188,  Euratom) 
The non-contractual liability of the Community and its servants is dealt with in the second 
paragraph of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty and the second paragraph of Article 188 of the 
Euratom Treaty in  a  rather fragmentary  manner.  As a  precondition for liability,  these 
provisions  mention  only  the  causing  of  damage  by  institutions  or  servants  of  the 
Community  in  the  perfomance  of  their  duties.  The  legal  consequence  specified  is 
compensation by  the Community for any damage.  Beyond this,  the Court of Justice is 
required to develop the further principles of liability from the general principles common to 
the laws  of the  Member States. 
According  to  the  case-law of the Court, liability for  damage  is  subject to the  following 
conditions: 
- unlawful action of an institution or servant of the Community in  the performance of a 
duty; 
- damage  caused  thereby; 
- existence of a  causal link  between the damage alleged and the conduct of which  the 
institution  is  accused. 
Since  1971,  the  Court has  also  recognized in  a  series of judgments liability  for  damage 
caused by legislative measures, subject, however, to the strict condition that the measures 
must  result  in  a  'sufficiently  flagrant  infringement  of a  superior  rule  of  law  for  the 
protection of the  individual'.  This means that actions for  damages based on legislative 
measures of the  Community rarely succeed. 
(bb)  ECSC Treaty  (Art.  40) 
According  to  the  present  version  of  the  ECSC Treaty,  the  Community is  liable  for  'a 
wrongful  act  or omission  on  the  part of the  Community'  (first  paragraph)  and  for  'a 
personal wrong by  a servant of the Community in the performance of his  duties' (second 
paragraph).  In both cases, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to order the Community 
to  pay  the injured party pecuniary compensation. 
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